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Abstract
With the rapid increase in online photo sharing activities,
image obfuscation algorithms become particularly important
for protecting the sensitive information in the shared pho-
tos. However, existing image obfuscation methods based on
hand-crafted principles are challenged by the dramatic devel-
opment of deep learning techniques. To address this problem,
we propose to maximize the distribution discrepancy between
the original image domain and the encrypted image domain.
Accordingly, we introduce a collaborative training scheme: a
discriminator D is trained to discriminate the reconstructed
image from the encrypted image, and an encryption model
Ge is required to generate these two kinds of images to max-
imize the recognition rate of D, leading to the same training
objective for bothD andGe. We theoretically prove that such
a training scheme maximizes two distributions’ discrepancy.
Compared with commonly-used image obfuscation methods,
our model can produce satisfactory defense against the attack
of deep recognition models indicated by significant accuracy
decreases on FaceScrub, Casia-WebFace and LFW datasets.
1 Introduction
With the popularization of mobile devices carrying high res-
olution cameras and the explosiveness of social networks,
there has been significant increase in personal photo sharing
online. While photo sharing has become part of our daily
life, privacy concerns are raised in photo leakage and photo
recognition by unauthorized users or algorithms. Image ob-
fuscation algorithms meanwhile are proposed to address the
challenge of image privacy leakage by obfuscating the sen-
sitive area in the images, such as faces, logos or objects.
For example, Pixelation and Blurring are the two most clas-
sic approaches that suppress recognizable sensitive features
while keeping everything else integral. However, encrypt-
ing photos by destroying information can also result in dif-
ficult restoration unless original ones are backed up, which
requires much more resources for network transmission and
cloud storage.
On the other hand, Ra, Govindan, and Ortega (2013) pro-
posed a reconstructable obfuscation algorithm, named P3,
which decomposes image’s JPEG coefficients into public
part and privacy part. However, these traditional approaches
omit to encrypt faces or other sensitive objects to be un-
recognizable by well-defined principles. In addition, simple
Figure 1: Given an input image, our goal is to make obfus-
cation for protecting its privacy information. Our approach,
which is based on distribution discrepancy maximization,
has better capability to defend attack from human visual
recognition and deep recognition models.
JPEG coefficients decomposition method fails to resist at-
tack from deep learning metrics which have shown dramatic
improvement on many high-level computer vision problems,
such as face recognition (Parkhi et al. 2015), image recog-
nition (Simonyan and Zisserman 2014) and so on. Com-
pared with traditional image attack algorithms, deep learn-
ing based approaches have stronger ability to represent se-
mantic structures (Zeiler and Fergus 2014), and are more
powerful to handle high-dimensional image data. Some
studies (Oh et al. 2016; R, R, and V 2016) have shown that
deep recognition models could extract privacy information
from human unrecognizable data encrypted by some image
obfuscation techniques.
To address the challenge from the deep learning, we pro-
pose to maximize the distribution discrepancy between the
original image domain and the encrypted image domain.
First, given an original input image, an encryption model
encodes the image into deep features which are decom-
posed into two parts, called public feature and privacy fea-
ture. Second, the encryption model is required to generate
reconstructed image (from public feature and privacy fea-
ture) and encrypted image (from public feature) to maximize
the recognition rate of a discriminator. Meanwhile, the dis-
criminator is trained to discriminate these two kinds of im-
ages. So the encryption model and discriminator keep the
same training objective, which is called as “collaborative
training scheme”. We theoretically prove that such training
scheme maximizes the two distributions’ discrepancy. Com-
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pared with Generative Adversarial Nets (GAN) (Goodfel-
low et al. 2014), where a generator is trained to maximize
the probability of discriminator making a mistake, the pro-
posed collaborative training scheme changes the relation-
ship between generator and discriminator, where both net-
works work as collaboration instead of competition. Third,
we minimize the pixel-wise and perceptual difference be-
tween the input and the reconstructed image, which ensures
that reconstructed images and the original images share the
same image domain. As a result, our model learns to squeeze
the privacy information into the privacy feature and produce
remarkable distribution discrepancy between the encrypted
images and the input images. We also empirically demon-
strate that distribution discrepancy maximization can effec-
tively protect the sensitive information of images from the
attack of deep recognition models and human visual recog-
nition, while a small amount of information is required to be
encrypted.
The contributions of this paper are summarized as fol-
lows:
• We propose to maximize the distribution discrepancy for
image privacy preserving. Our proposal is effective to de-
fend recognition from human and deep learning based
methods.
• We introduce a collaborative training scheme which is
theoretically proved to maximize the distribution discrep-
ancy between two image domains.
The remaining parts are organized as follows. We intro-
duce related work in Section 2 and present the details of our
method in Section 3. The theoretical analysis of collabora-
tive training scheme is given in Section 4. The implement
details are described in Section 5. Then we report experi-
mental results in Section 6 and conclude in Section 7.
2 Related Work
2.1 Image Obfuscation Algorithms
There are mainly three kinds of image obfuscation algo-
rithms, including Blurring, Pixelation and P3. Both Blur-
ring and Pixelation share similar encryption principle and
have been widely applied to encrypt face images and sensi-
tive objects. Pixelation first divides the image into square
grids. Then the average pixel value of current grid is as-
signed to each entire grid, which is similar to an average
pooling operation applied for images. Ryoo et al. (2017)
suggested that reliable face recognition from extreme low
resolution scheme (with scale factor x20) will be difficult for
both machines and humans. Blurring convolves the image
with Gaussian kernel to obscure the detail of image, which
is similar to a convolutional operation with fixed values. In
2012 and 2016, YouTube utilizes Blurring as a way to pro-
tect video privacy and introduces to automatically blur faces
in (YouTube Official Blog 2012) and objects in (YouTube
Official Blog 2016). However, Blurring and Pixelation do
not wipe all image or video information off, and have been
demonstrated that they may degrade the visual recognition
but are insufficient for privacy protection (Gopalan et al.
2012).
Ra, Govindan, and Ortega (2013) proposed a privacy-
preserving photo encoding algorithm called P3. They de-
composed the JPEG image into a public image and a secret
image. The decomposition operation is based on assumption
that DC coefficients and AC coefficients whose values are
larger than a threshold carry the most information about the
image, which should be encrypted and extracted in the se-
cret image. Public image is excluded sensitive information
and can be uploaded it to public servers. Our work shares
the similar philosophy with P3. The difference is that the
decomposing operation is conducted on deep features in-
stead of JPEG coefficients. In addition, we propose to learn
to decompose privacy part and public part using a collab-
orative training scheme instead of manually designed tech-
nique, which is more robust under the attack of deep recog-
nition models.
2.2 Attack Methods for Decrypting the
Encrypted Images
Traditional visual recognition works usually extract hand-
crafted features, including SIFT (Lowe 2004), HOG (Dalal
and Triggs 2005), and feed them to classifiers. For exam-
ple, Viola and Jones (2004) proposed a fast face detection
method based on low-level features aggregation and cas-
cade classifiers combination. A classic face recognition al-
gorithms take a face images as input and match it with
face eigenvectors of a face dataset, such as Eigenface (Turk
and Pentland 1991). With the dramatic development of deep
learning, deep learning based methods have shown STOA
performance on many recognition tasks. The capability of
deep learning also has been utilized to discover the relevant
features or relationship in encrypted images. Works in (Oh
et al. 2016; R, R, and V 2016) employed deep recognition
models to successfully defeat common image obfuscation
algorithms such as Pixelation, Blurring and P3. In addition,
DNN also shows outstanding ability to restore images from
severe noise and low-resolution, such as methods in (Mao,
Shen, and Yang 2016; Yu and Porikli 2016), which can also
be used as a pre-processing step for decrypting. The exper-
imental results of these methods reveal that well-designed
deep learning methods can still recognize the sensitive in-
formation of encrypted images.
2.3 Adversarial Attack on Deep Learning
As deep learning achieves significant performance in vi-
sual recognition and detection tasks, several works also fo-
cused on attacking the powerful deep models. These meth-
ods tried to build a modified version of a clean image that
is intentionally perturbed to confuse a deep neural net-
works, which misclassifies the image with high probabil-
ity (Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2015; Mopuri, Garg,
and Babu 2017; Raval, Machanavajjhala, and Cox 2017;
Oh, Fritz, and Schiele 2017; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. 2017).
It’s worth to note that this adversarial perturbation changes
the visual information of images slightly, which is hardly
noticed by human. The essential difference between adver-
sarial perturbation methods and ours is the human recogniz-
ability of images after encryption. The goal of our work is to
defend the attack from deep recognition methods as well as
Figure 2: Architecture of encryption model and discriminator.
encrypting images being unrecognizable by human. Experi-
ment results in Section 6.2 also show that our work achieves
better performance on the attack of deep recognition models.
3 Our Method
3.1 Problem Formulation
We first formulate the decomposition and reconstruction
process to clarify image privacy preserving problem. Given
one image input x. Following the basic assumption of our
paper, x can be represented by two kinds of features as
x = xpb ⊕ xpr, where xpb is public feature, xpr is privacy
feature and⊕ is the operator that can merge the two kinds of
features into a complete image. Then the problem of privacy
preserving problem is as follows: taking an image x as input
and outputting a reconstructed image xr that is the estima-
tion of the original input image, and encrypted image xe that
is unrecognizable from original input image, i.e.,
xr = Gx→r(x) = xpb ⊕ xpr, (1)
xe = Gx→e(x) = xpb ⊕ xfr, (2)
where Gx→r denotes the reconstruction function, Gx→e de-
notes the encryption function, and xfr is the faked privacy
feature. xfr is set to xpr+n, n is AWGN noise (standard de-
viation = 1), which requires xe to be different from xr unless
using the correct privacy feature. An implicit assumption of
our problem formulation is that the public part is exposed
during transportation while the privacy part is encrypted and
transported as paradigm suggested in (Deng and Long 2004;
Mink et al. 2006). So privacy feature should include the key
information and be as little as possible for transmission effi-
ciency.
3.2 Network Architecture
Our network architecture is shown in Figure 2, which mainly
includes one AutoEncoder-like encryption model Ge and
one discriminator D. We first feeds the original input image
x into the encoder network of Ge to extract deep features.
Then the deep features are decomposed into two part, public
part xpb and privacy part xpr. In particular, given one image
input x, we have:
(xpb, xpr) = e(x), (3)
where e is the encoder network of Ge. We generate recon-
structed image xr and encrypted image xe as following:
xr = g(x
pb, xpr); xe = g(x
pb, xfr), (4)
where g is the decoder network of Ge. Currently, there is
no obvious difference between public feature and privacy
feature. In the remaining sections, we will present the overall
training process that differentiates the two kinds of features.
3.3 Collaborative Training Scheme
We introduce a collaborative training scheme for distribution
discrepancy maximization between the original image do-
main and the encrypted image domain. We define a discrim-
inator D that is trained to discriminate the reconstructed im-
age from the encrypted image, and a encryption modelGe is
required to generate encrypted image and reconstructed im-
age maximizing recognition rate of D. The objective func-
tion of discriminator D is given as:
`D =Exr∼pr(x)[BCE(D(xr), 1)]
+ Exe∼pe(x)[BCE(D(xe), 0)],
(5)
where BCE is the binary cross entropy loss function. Ac-
cordingly, the collaborative objective function of the encryp-
tion model Ge can be given as:
`adG =Exr∼pr(x)[BCE(D(xr), 1)]
+ Exe∼pe(x)[BCE(D(xe), 0)].
(6)
So the encryption model and discriminator have the same
objective to optimize, which is called as “collaborative train-
ing scheme”. In the Section 4, we will present a theoretical
analysis of collaborative training scheme, which shows that
such training process makes the distributions of the recon-
structed images and the encrypted images be discrepant. Al-
though here we maximize the distribution discrepancy be-
tween the encrypted samples and the reconstructed samples,
we present experiment results that our model can also pro-
vide a well reconstruction of the original samples in Section
6.1 and Section 6.4.
3.4 Reconstruction
Furthermore, image obfuscation model should also maintain
the whole completeness of input image. Intuitively, this can
be easily realized by constraining Mean Square Error (MSE)
between reconstructed image xr and input image x as fol-
lowing loss function:
`r,mG = Ex∼p(x)[‖xr − x‖22]. (7)
We also leverage a perceptual loss (Johnson, Alahi, and Fei-
Fei 2016), which depends on high-level features from a pre-
trained loss network, such as VGG network (Simonyan and
Zisserman 2014), together with MSE loss for reconstruction
constraint. Such multi-perceptual level constraint further en-
ables the information reconstructed into xr. The full objec-
tive function for reconstruction is:
`rG = `
r,m
G + λEx∼p(x)[‖φ(xr)− φ(x)‖22], (8)
where φ is one pre-trained network and λ is set to 0.01 for
loss balance.
3.5 Full Objective
Our full objective for encryption model Ge is:
`G = `
ad
G + `
r
G. (9)
We summarize the training process in Algorithm 1. In Algo-
rithm 1, the choice of optimizers Opt(·, ·) is quite flexible,
whose two inputs are the parameters to be optimized and the
corresponding gradients. We choose Adam (Kingma and Ba
2014) in our real implement. Besides, the Ge and D might
refer to either the models themselves, or their parameters,
depending on the context.
Algorithm 1 Collaborative training process
Require: Training images {x}mi=1 ⊂ D, batch size K, op-
timizer Opt(·, ·), weight parameters (λ);
1: Randomly initialize Ge and D.
2: Randomly sample a minibatch of images and prepare
the batch training data S = {xk}Kk=1.
3: For any data xk ∈ S , extract public feature and pri-
vacy feature by Eqn.(3), generate reconstructed image
and encrypted image by Eqn.(4);
4: Update the discriminator as follows:
D ← Opt(D, (1/K)∇D
∑K
k=1`D(xk));
5: Update the encryption model as follows:
Ge ← Opt(Ge, (1/K)∇Ge
∑K
k=1`G(xk));
6: Repeat step 2 to step 6 until convergence
4 Theoretical Analysis
Proposition 1. Given a fixed Ge, the optimal discriminator
D is
D∗w,G(x) =
pr(x)
pr(x) + pe(x)
. (10)
Proof. For a fixed encryption model Ge, the training crite-
rion of D is to minimize the loss function in Eqn.(5). As
shown in the Goodfellow et al. (Goodfellow et al. 2014), it
is easy to obtain the minimum at pr(x)pr(x)+pe(x) .
Proposition 2. Under an optimal discriminator, the en-
cryption model Ge maximizes the Jensen-Shanon diver-
gence.
Proof. By inspecting Eqn.(10) into Eqn.(6), we obtain:
`adG,D∗ =Exr∼pr(x)[BCE(D
∗
w,G(xr), 1)]
+ Exe∼pe(x)[BCE(D
∗
w,G(xe), 0)]
=log(4)−KL
(
pr‖pr + pe
2
)
−KL
(
pe‖pr + pe
2
)
,
(11)
which KL is the Kullback-Leibler divergence. Eqn.(11) can
be rewritten in terms of the Jensen-Shannon divergence as:
`adG,D∗ = log(4)− 2JSD(pr‖+ pe). (12)
The Jensen-Shannon divergence between two distributions
is always non-negative and achieves zero only when they are
equal. Therefore, minimizing `adG,D∗ can directly maximize
the JSD between pr and pe.
5 Implement Details
5.1 Network Configuration
For the encryption model, the encoder contains four stride-2
convolution layers, three residual blocks between two con-
volution layers, and the encoder contains four stride-2 de-
convolution layers, three residual blocks between two de-
convolution layers. The encoder outputs 64 feature maps
which is split into 63 public feature maps and 1 privacy fea-
ture map. For the discriminator, it consists of four stride-2
convolution layers and two fully connected layers. For all
the image obfuscation experiments, our network takes im-
ages of 128× 128× 3 as inputs.
For toy experiment in Section 6.1, simpler models are im-
plemented. We use two fully-connected layers for both en-
coder and decoder in encryption model . The number of
neurons of each layers is 2 − 128 − 128 in encoder and
128 − 128 − 2 in decoder. We then split the neurons of en-
coder into 126 public neurons and 2 privacy neurons. For
discriminator, we use five fully-connected layers.
5.2 Datasets
In the following experiments, we train our model on the
Large-scale CelebFaces Attributes (CelebA) dataset (Liu et
al. 2015), which contains 202, 599 celebrity face images and
10, 177 identities. The images were obtained from the inter-
net and vary extensively in terms of pose, expression, light-
ing, image quality, background clutter and occlusion, which
is quite challenging to test the robustness of image obfusca-
tion algorithms.
The recognition comparison experiments are conducted
on Facescrub Dataset (Ng and Winkler 2014), CASIA-
WebFace Dataset (Yi et al. 2014) and LFW dataset (Huang
et al. 2008).
6 Experiment
6.1 Toy Experiment
To empirically demonstrate our explanations on distribution
discrepancy maximization between two domains, we design
an illustrative experiment based on 2-dimensional synthetic
samples as shown in Figure 3. We generate ten group data
points in 2-dimensional space distinguished by different col-
ors. Our goal is to obfuscate these samples in the encryption
domain, while maintaining them in the reconstructed results.
In Figure 3, we could intuitively observe the trend of dis-
tribution changing in the training process. Our model grad-
ually shifts the distribution of encrypted samples away from
original ten group distributions, and finally aggregates all
the encrypted samples into nearly one single group. For
reconstruction, the distribution of reconstructed results is
highly consistent with original distribution, which supports
our practice that the distribution discrepancy maximization
between encrypted samples and reconstructed samples is
basically equal to the maximization between the encrypted
samples and the original samples. We also observe that the
reconstruction converges much earlier than the encryption,
and remains stable after 500 training iterations. Although
this experiment is limited due to its simplicity, the results
clearly support the validity of our proposed method.
Figure 3: Distribution discrepancy maximization process on
synthetic samples. The distribution of ten group generated
samples is distinguished by different colors. Top row: ini-
tial distribution of original samples. Medium row: the dis-
tribution of encrypted samples of different training iteration.
Bottom row: the distribution of reconstructed samples of dif-
ferent training iteration.
6.2 Comparison Results
Baseline We compare our model with three obfuscation
methods, including Pixelation, Blurring, P3 (Ra, Govindan,
and Ortega 2013). For Pixelation, we downsample the im-
ages based on the scale factor x20, which could lead to
better obfuscation results (Ryoo et al. 2017). For Blurring,
Table 1: Recognition accuracy of plain convolutional net-
work on the Facescrub dataset encrypted by different meth-
ods.
Method Facescrub
Original 84.6%
Random 0.19%
Pixelation(20) 44.4%
Blurring(16) 41.2%
P3(1) 23.4%
MSEDNet 36.1%
Ours 3.43%
Table 2: Recognition accuracy of FaceNet on the Casia-
WebFace & LFW datasets encrypted by different methods.
Method Casia-WebFace LFW
Original 87.5% 98.9%
Random 0.0095% 0.017%
Pixelation(20) 34.0% 20.9%
Blurring(16) 51.8% 54.3%
P3(1) 35.2% 21.7%
MSEDNet 34.7% 21.9%
Ours 0.01% 0.02%
we compare with Blurring radius 16. For P3, as the smaller
threshold causes the better encrypted effect, we choose the
smallest threshold 1 for comparison. In addition to existed
methods, we design a MSEDNet that is a MSE based de-
composition network without collaborative training. The ob-
jective function of MSEDNet is:
`MG = `
r
G − Ex∼p(x)[‖φ(xe)− φ(x)‖22]. (13)
The goal of MSEDNet is to maximize the perceptual loss
between the input image and the encrypted image, and min-
imize the reconstruction loss between the input image and
the reconstructed image.
Deep Recognition Attack Model We follow the experi-
mental process as proposed in (R, R, and V 2016). We as-
sume that one adversary can input original un-encrypted im-
ages to obfuscation algorithms (in online social network)
and get the corresponding encrypted images. Therefore, we
generate the training set by applying obfuscation algorithms
to the original images. Then we perform supervised learning
on the encrypted images to obtain the deep encrypted-image
recognition models. Finally, the performance of obfuscation
algorithms are measured by the accuracy of trained recogni-
tion models.
In our experiments, we first evaluate on Facescrube
dataset by a plain convolutional network as the settings of
(R, R, and V 2016). Then we deploy a more powerful at-
tack model, FaceNet (Schroff, Kalenichenko, and Philbin
2015), which is a deep learning architecture consisting of
convolutional layers based on GoogLeNet inspired incep-
tion models. Instead of the triplet loss presented in FaceNet,
we train the attack model using softmax loss for more stable
and faster convergence, which could also achieve well per-
formed results. We choose nine-tenth encrypted face images
of each celebrity in CASIA-WebFace for FaceNet model
Figure 4: The visual encryption results comparison of differ-
ent methods.
training, and evaluate on the remaining of CASIA-WebFace
dataset and LFW dataset.
Figure 5: The visual results of our model with and without
collaborative training scheme.
Encryption Results Comparison We report the accuracy
of plain convolutional neural network on Facescrub dataset
in Table 1. By applying different image obfuscation algo-
rithms for face encryption, we can observe that the recogni-
tion accuracy of Pixelation, Blurring and P3 decreases by a
large margin. However, all accuracy of these algorithms does
not drop below 20%. Although MSEDNet tries to maximize
the perceptual distance, the result also shows its insufficient
ability against deep recognition model. In comparison, our
method achieves 3.43% accuracy, which is relatively closer
to random guess. The face recognition results on the Casia-
WebFace & LFW datasets are also presented in Table 2.
Even a more powerful deep model FaceNet is applied for
encrypted face recognition, our model still significantly out-
performs other methods on these two datasets. The accuracy
Table 3: Recognition accuracy comparison between adver-
sarial perturbation methods and our model with FaceNet
trained on original Casia-WebFace dataset.
Methods Accuracy
Origin 98.9%
UAP (Mopuri, Garg, and Babu 2017) 63.0%
FGSM (Goodfellow, Shlens, and
Szegedy 2015)
19.8%
Ours 0.01%
of the attack model on our method is also close to random
guess. It is important to note that our discriminator and the
deep recognition model do not have any parameter sharing
and implicit relationship. Considering that the deep recog-
nition model is a highly non-linear learning structure, it in-
dicates that our model can produce encrypted images that
are significantly different from input images through collab-
orative training scheme. From the visual encryption results
in Figure 4, we can find that the encrypted results produced
by our model are also visually un-recognizable. Therefore,
we verify that our model can effectively protect the sensitive
information of images from the attack of deep recognition
models and human visual recognition.
Additional Comparison with Adversarial Perturbation
Methods In this subsection, we compare with two adver-
sarial perturbation methods, including Fast Gradient Step
Method (FGSM) (Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2015)
and Universal Adversarial Perturbations (UAP) (Mopuri,
Garg, and Babu 2017), which aims to clarify the difference
between adversarial perturbation methods and our model.
We evaluate the face recognition accuracy on LFW dataset
with FaceNet model pre-trained on original images of Casia-
WebFace Dataset, since adversarial perturbation aims to
make a existing deep model misclassify images of pertur-
bations. As shown in Table 3, our model can greatly mislead
the pre-trained FaceNet compared with adversarial pertur-
bation methods, which indicates that images encrypted by
removing privacy feature in the latent space ensures much
better privacy preserving than adversarial perturbation.
6.3 Effectiveness of Collaborative Training
Scheme
In this section, we analyze the effectiveness of collaborative
training scheme. We compare the results of our model and
model without collaborative training scheme. The visual re-
sults are shown in Figure 5. In addition to the recognition
accuracy of FaceNet on the Casia-WebFace encrypted by
our model, to show the quality of reconstructed image and
compare the quality degradation between reconstructed im-
age and encrypted image, PNSR results of reconstructed and
encrypted images are also provided in Table 4. We can ob-
serve that, by directly removing feature maps without pro-
posed collaborative training scheme, the encrypted image
maintains most of recognizable information of the input im-
age and can not guarantee the privacy safety. In addition,
the model with collaborative training can reconstruct image
as well as the model without collaborative training, which
Figure 6: The visual results of different proportions of privacy part.
Table 4: PSNR (dB) of reconstructed and encrypted images,
and defense performance of our model with/without collab-
orative training scheme.
Collaborative Loss Reconstructed Encrypted Accuracy
(dB) (dB)
With 33.31 4.65 0.01%
Without 33.65 17.06 79.6%
indicates that the collaborative training pushes privacy in-
formation into the privacy part without losing the overall
image information. Therefore, we have shown that collab-
orative loss is essential for excluding privacy information
from the public part and producing highly unrecognizable
encrypted images.
6.4 Robustness to the Proportion of Privacy Part
We have shown that our model can achieve extraordinary
encryption performance with one 64th of deep features ex-
tracted as privacy part, we here continue to explore our
model’s robustness to the different proportions of privacy
part, including 1/2048, 1/1024, 1/128, 1/64, 1/32, 1/16,
1/8, 1/4 and 1/2. The visual results of models with different
proportions of privacy part are shown in Figure 6. Similarly,
we show the reconstruction quality, encryption quality and
accuracy of different proportions compared with P3 in Table
5. From the experiment results, we can see that our model
is quite robust to the various proportions of privacy part in
terms of reconstruction quality and encryption accuracy. In
addition, our model can achieve comparable reconstruction
quality compared with P3 that are based on JEPG coding
standard, while much lower proportion of privacy part than
p3 is required by our model. We choose 1/64 as our main
configuration to achieve a trade-off among reconstruction
quality, encryption accuracy and proportion.
Table 5: PSNR (dB) results and defense performance of dif-
ferent proportions of privacy part .
Method Proportion Reconstructed Encrypted Accuracy
(dB) (dB)
P3(20) 19.68%(≈ 1/5) 37.86 12.10 67.2%
P3(10) 23.5%(≈ 1/4) 35.03 12.00 62.3%
P3(1) 55.62%(≈ 1/2) 30.83 11.85 35.2%
Ours
1/2048 30.12 5.75 0.055%
1/1024 30.42 5.19 0.052%
1/128 33.31 4.65 0.016%
1/64 34.00 4.41 0.01%
1/32 33.99 5.17 0.01%
1/16 33.96 4.82 0.01%
1/8 33.99 4.75 0.01%
1/4 34.54 4.64 0.01%
1/2 34.83 5.02 0.01%
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose to maximize the distribution dis-
crepancy for image privacy preserving. Given an input im-
age, our model decomposes it into public feature and privacy
feature, and generates a reconstructed image and a encrypted
image accordingly. To produce distribution discrepancy be-
tween the input image and the encrypted image, we intro-
duce a collaborative training scheme, where a discriminator
and a encryption model are trained to optimize the same ob-
jective. We theoretically prove that the collaborative training
scheme maximizes the distribution discrepancy. We conduct
sufficient experiments to validate effectiveness of our pro-
posed technique. Compared with existing image obfuscation
methods, our model can produce satisfactory defense under
the attack of deep recognition model while maintaining the
quality of reconstruction.
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